The Iranian Revolution began as a series of demonstrations in January 1978, which spread throughout Iran and culminated in the Shah of Iran Mohammed Reza Pahlavi fleeing the country on January 16, 1979 (3). Citizens from different socio-economic and political backgrounds came together to protest against the Shah. The Shia clerics took the leadership role in the revolution aiming to overthrow the monarchy, which was officially replaced by the Islamic Republic in February 1979. Although the main outcome of the revolution was a theocracy, how significant was religion in causing the revolution itself?
Religious opposition increased following the Shah’s White Revolution in 1963, especially amongst the Ulema. The White Revolution’s twelve points, including land reform and emancipating women (4) contradicted Islamic Law; consequently, Ayatollah Borujerdi issued a fatwa in March 1960 condemning the reforms as un-Islamic and unconstitutional (5). Borujerdi’s death in 1961 left a vacuum in the religious establishment for Ayatollah Khomeini to fill. Most importantly, Khomeini’s criticism of the Shah was not only directed at his failed economic policies and reforms, but he argued that monarchy in itself was ‘alien to Islam’ (6) and should therefore be overthrown. Positioning the Shah as inherently incompatible with Islam, Khomeini’s lectures and sermons were recorded and circulated in Iran via his former students and his statements garnered support as they reminded Iranians of “the shared heritage of religious protests” (7), such as the constitutional revolution of 1905-11.
Marxist views of the revolution assert that the Ulema came later on during the revolution. (8) And while some historians argue that many members of the Ulema believed it was not the clergy’s place to participate in political activities (9), many of those who promoted Shia Islam as an ideology for the revolution were not clerics or linked to the Ulema. Ali Shariati, the most influential member of the Freedom Movement of Iran, advocated Shiism and pushed forward the notion that Shia Islam encouraged its adherents to rise against the oppressors, in this case, the Shah. In comparison to the mostly apolitical Ulema, whom Shariati criticized, “Shariati’s call for action was immensely popular among high school and university students” (10), and his lectures were widely distributed as recording tapes and in print. Young Muslims were more willing to accept and emphasize their Shia identity as Shariati appealed to students in his university lectures to defend Islam from the West. This ‘revolutionary Islam’ (11) wasn’t a contradiction as it successfully spoke to the traditional Shiite Iranians whilst attracting young students with its mix of traditional and progressive thoughts. Whilst Shariati initially combined Marxist and Shiite elements into his doctrines, Khomeini publicly supported him, allowing Khomeini to become a symbol of Revolutionary Islam amongst two important groups: the youth and conservatives in Iranian society. The Shah’s suppression of secular opposition such as the Tudeh Party after 1953 “left room for the religious opposition” (12) to gain support among the youth.
Religious imagery during the revolution was prevalent on posters of Shariati and Khomeini; it was the Shia belief in the savior figure that encouraged the people to overthrow the Shah. Shariati’s mysterious death in 1977 made him “a mythical figure in militant Islam” (13) and Ansari recognizes “a messianic quality to Khomeini’s leadership” (14), especially as the Algiers Accord of 1975 made the holy Shiite cities of Karbala and Najaf in Iraq accessible to Iranian pilgrims, encouraging them to visit Khomeini during his exile in Najaf and smuggle his recorded sermons back to Iran.
The presence of non-Muslims whom Iranians perceived as ‘agents of Western Imperialism’ (15), also created tensions in Iranian society and caused dissatisfaction amongst Iranians following the oil boom of the 1970s. Khomeini attacked the Shah for allowing Western influences into Iran, which he claimed would lead to the “destruction of Iran’s Islamic identity” (16). Jalal Al-e Ahmed’s pamphlet ‘Westoxification’ argued that Shiism was necessary as a “national struggle against monarchy” (17). The presence of American citizens in particular generated anti-Shah sentiments amongst Iranian citizens. In 1964, the US sought immunity of American citizens in Iran from any persecution, simultaneously the news of a ‘$200 million loan from the US for the purchase of arms’ (18) made it seem the two were linked. Khomeini exploited this during his exile in Najaf, his sermons were recorded and broadcast in the streets of Iran: “These people can commit any crime they want in Iran. If an American cook murders your marja (religious leader) in the bazaar, nobody has the right to condemn him.”19 This created antagonistic feelings as it seemed non-Muslim foreigners were above Muslim Iranians in the law and increased support of Khomeini and the Ulema.
Nevertheless, the presence of Americans during the 70s was “small in relative, statistical terms” (20). It was Western culture such as the presence of prostitutes and casinos in Tehran that was seen as insulting to Islam, as demonstrated during the revolution when protesters attacked alcohol shops and cinemas (21). Increased urban migration resulted in young men from the conservative countryside in Westernized cities that displayed “immorality and disregard for religion” (22). The disillusioned youth living in overcrowded cities formed the majority of the resistance, and despite rapid modernization, it could be argued that it was the decadent environment that made them ‘receptive to the calls for protest’ (23). According to Keddie, “Islam was believed by, and familiar to, the great mass of Iranians” (24), this could explain why Islam was persuading even for secular Iranians since Islam could be the solution to problems that were unaddressed by the Shah. Even secular groups used ‘religious tactics’ to mobilize the people against the Shah (25). For example, many young female university students began wearing the veil to show their opposition to the Shah.
The celebration of 2,500 years of Iranian monarchy increased anti-Shah sentiments as it was viewed as religiously offensive. Firstly, the extravagant spending on the ceremony only highlighted the corruption, decadence, and unequal distribution of wealth associated with the royal family. The celebrations focused solely on Iran’s pre-Islamic history; ‘excluding Islam’ (26) offended Iranians since Shia Islam had been deeply embedded in Iranian society. In 1976, the Shah created a new imperial calendar from the reign of Cyrus the Great, this surprised Iranians as the pre-Islamic calendar replaced the Hijri calendar. The Shiraz Festival of 1977 organized by Empress Farah in Iran “excelled in insults to Iranian moral values” (27) and raised ‘considerable religious ire’ (28). These instances, which seemed to oppose Muslim values, were increasingly linked to the royal family and further alienated the people from the Shah.
The Shah used the Resurgence Party in 1975 to launch an attack on the religious establishment and attempt to control politically autonomous groups such as the Bazaaris. Cleveland said the government aimed to “reduce the role of Islam in daily life and glorify the monarchy at the expense of Islamic norms of identity” (29). This resulted in rising tensions between the government and the middle-class merchants, who began criticizing the government and closed their shops in defiance of the government (30). The conservative Bazaaris would play an important role in organizing and financing opposition to the Shah.
Gatherings at mosques and Shia traditions were used to generate resistance against the Shah. An Ettelat article accusing Khomeini of being a British spy and homosexual (31) resulted in protests by Bazaaris and religious students in Qom. This spread in Iran’s major cities, and on February 18, 1978, army tanks in Tabriz killed 100 demonstrators (32). The deaths at Qom gave the opposition “an Islamic colouring” (33), a Shia custom whereby the opposition members would gather forty days after the death of a loved one, creating a cycle of forty-day mourning periods and memorial services at mosques, allowing opposition to build momentum.
Protests and opposition to the Shah were increasingly religiously influenced especially following Ramadan, which ‘heightened religious feeling’ (34). The passion plays recreating the death of Imam Hussein by Umayyad Caliph Yazid allowed the audience to make parallels between the tyranny of Yazid and the Shah, even secular Iranians would be inspired by the Shia myths of martyrdom (35). During Moharram of 1978 (36), the holiest month for Shias, thousands of protesters went into the streets wearing white, which grew into a demonstration of 2 million people in Tehran on December 12 (37).
The government’s concessions also show an awareness of the impact of religion on the opposition as Jafar Sharif Emami became Prime Minister in 1978 and reinstated the Hijri Calendar, closed down casinos, censored publications offensive to Islam, and released imprisoned Ulema members in Iran. The Shah made a speech following the dismissal of Emami’s government on November 6, 1978, the use of religious connotations such as the “God-given gift” (38) of the monarch and his vow to “(protect) Islamic precepts” (39), is evidence of the Shah’s unconvincing attempt to reinforce his religious legitimacy.
Religion played a significant role in causing the 1979 Revolution since Islam was viewed and promoted as an ideology by influential figures, from nationalist Ali Shariati to Ayatollah Khomeini, as an alternative to monarchy. Shia Islam was at the core of Iranian identity, by ignoring Iran’s religious values, its Islamic history, and increasing foreign influence, the Shah alienated himself from Iranians. Shiite traditions and beliefs in martyrdom and resistance inspired opposition and allowed the anti-Shah clergy to be the center of protests and gatherings, financed by the conservative middle-class merchants. Religion was significant in unifying the population from the liberal youth to the Bazaaris against the Shah towards revolution.
Books:
Ansari, A.M. (2003). Modern Iran Since 1921: The Pahlavis and After. 1st ed. Great Britain: Pearson Education Limited.
Axworthy, M. (2014). Revolutionary Iran. 1st ed. London: Penguin Books. Cleveland. W.L. (2004). A History of the Modern Middle East. 3rd ed. Colorado: Westview Press.
Keddie, N.R. (2003). Modern Iran: roots and results of revolution. 2nd ed. United States of America: Yale University.
Documentary:
BBC. (1982). The Last Shah. [Online Video]. 10 August 2016. Available from: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k6zl1mmcqD4. [Accessed: 15 February 2017].
Journals:
Skocpol, T. (1982). Rentier State and Shi’a Islam in the Iranian Revolution in Theory and Society, Vol. 11, No. 3. Amsterdam: Elsevier Scientific Publishing Company.
Moaddel, M. (1992). Ideology as Episodic Discourse: The Case of Iranian Revolution in American Sociological Review, Vol.57, No.3 pp.353-379. Michigan: Eastern Michigan University.
Footnotes:
3 Cleveland, W.L. (2004) p430
4 Ansari, A.M. (2003) p157
5 Ansari, A.M. (2003) p153
6 Cleveland, W.L. (2004) p427
7 Cleveland, W.L. (2004) p428
8 Moaddel, M. (1992)
9 Cleveland, W.L. (2004) p426
10 Axworthy, M. (2014) p68
11 Ansari, A.M. (2003) p201
12 Keddie, N. (2003) p167
13 Keddie, N. (2003) p207
14 Ansari, A.M. (2003) p211
15 Cleveland, W.L. (2004) p425
16 Cleveland, W.L. (2004) p427
17 Keddie, N. (2003) p190
18 Ansari, A.M. (2003) p162
19 BBC Documentary. (1982)
20 Axworthy, M. (2014) p81
21 Axworthy, M. (2014) p105
22 Axworthy, M. (2014) p80
23 ibid.
24 Keddie, N. (2003) p212
25 Moaddel, M. (1992) p366
26 Moaddel, M. (1992) p363
27 British Ambassador to Iran Sir Anthony Parsons quoted in Ansari, A.M. (2003) p198 28 A.M. (2003) p198
29 Cleveland, W.L. (2004) p424
30 Ansari, A.M. (2003) p202
31 Axworthy, M. (2014) p104
32 Cleveland, W.L. (2004) p428
33 Cleveland, W.L. (2004) p428
34 Axworthy, M. (2014) p108
35 Skocpol, T. (1982) p264
36 December 2 in the Gregorian Calendar
37 Cleveland, W.L. (2004) p430
38 Ansari, A.M. (2003) p206
39 ibid.
— 2017